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‘A cat’s paw of Indian reactionaries?’ 
Strategic Rivalry and Domestic Politics at the India-China-
Myanmar Tri-junction 
Abstract: 
Ostensibly driven by concerns over a military standoff with China similar to Doklam, 
India increased military deployment at the Myanmar tri-junction. This article assesses 
the inevitability of systemic factors such as rivalry with China in determining India's 
approach on border issues. It asks why India sought formalization of its boundary with 
Burma in 1967? Given its territorial disputes with China, resolving the Burma 
boundary should have been high priority. Still, it took India two decades after 
independence to broach the subject. Based on fresh archival and interview data, this 
article answers the question by examining the India-Burma Boundary Agreement. A 
three-party territorial dispute, the making of this agreement witnessed simultaneous 
interplay between states with visible power differentials, and various stakeholders 
within India’s polity and bureaucracy. The article argues that even when inter-state 
competition is apparent, domestic factors may be more important in triggering foreign 
policy change. 
Avinash Paliwal
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Introduction1  
 
The rhetoric of ‘standing up’ to China, showing Pakistan ‘its place’, and 
protecting ‘every inch’ of national territory are powerful, and intertwined, drivers of 
modern India’s foreign policy.2 The 2017 Sino-Indian military standoff in Doklam at 
the Bhutan tri-junction reified some of these narratives as the crisis re-focused 
attention on (a) the risk of active conflict between the two powers over an unsettled 
border dispute, and (b) India’s management of relations with smaller neighbours in 
light of strategic rivalry with China.3 Indeed, China’s expanding economic footprint in 
South Asia as part of the Belt-and-Roads Initiative (BRI) has increased stress on India 
to compete with Beijing for maintaining strategic influence over its smaller 
neighbours.4 Throughout the Doklam crisis, which occurred in the backdrop of India’s 
refusal to join the BRI, New Delhi sought to secure its ‘special relationship’ with 
                                                        
1 The Centre for International Studies and Diplomacy (CISD) at SOAS University of London provided 
funding support for the archival research that went into this article and for hosting the ‘Foreign Policy 
Analysis and Indian Foreign Policy’ workshop in February 2018. In New Delhi, Asmita Mahajan offered 
stellar research assistance at the National Archives of India (NAI) and the Nehru Memorial Museum and 
Library (NMML). A longer version of this article benefited tremendously from feedback by (in no 
particular order) Swapna Kona Nayudu, Karthik Nachiappan, Martin Bayly, Shashank Joshi, Nicolas 
Blarel, and Walter Ladwig. Thanks also to the two anonymous reviewers who highlighted areas of 
improvement and gave valuable advice.  
2 If one creates a hierarchy of foreign policy objectives for India, these three are likely to top the list. Other 
interconnected objectives range from, but are not limited to, economic development, protecting equal 
human rights, great power status, Non-Alignment, national security, and protecting interests of the Indian 
diaspora, to seeking/offering ‘good’ global governance. For an overview of India’s foreign policy see David 
Malone, Does the Elephant Dance? Contemporary Indian Foreign Policy (New York: OUP, 2012); Srinath 
Raghavan, C Raja Mohan, and David Malone, The Oxford Handbook of Indian Foreign Policy (New Yok: 
OUP, 2015)    
3 Prashant Jha, ‘India will adopt a three-pronged strategy to check China influence’, Hindustan Times, 
08/007/2018; For more on Sino-Indian dynamics, see: Frank O’Donnell, ‘Stabilizing Sino-Indian Security 
Relations: Managing Strategic Rivalry After Doklam’, Carnegie-Tsinghua Centre for Global Policy, June 
2018 
4  On BRI see Michael Clarke, ‘The Belt and Road Initiative: Exploring Beijing’s Motivations and 
Challenges for its New Silk Road’, Strategic Analysis, 42 (2), 2018, 84-102; and for China’s response to 
India’s rise see Oriana S Mastro, ‘It Takes Two to Tango: Autocratic Underbalancing, Regime Legitimacy 
and China’s responses to India’s Rise’, Journal of Strategic Studies, July 2018  
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Bhutan, and not loose territory to China. 5  What went largely unnoticed was New 
Delhi’s troop build-up at the tri-junction with Myanmar. 6  Given the situation in 
Doklam, this was a logical military precaution from an Indian standpoint. The 
difference remains that unlike Bhutan, India does not have special relations with 
Myanmar. If anything, Myanmar is heavily dependent on China, and India has failed 
to become a credible counter-balance despite reinvigorating its ‘Act East’ policy, which 
emphasizes on economic connectivity to Southeast Asia via Myanmar.7 Regardless of 
these contextual differences, it is conventional wisdom that strategic rivalry with China 
drives India’s ‘Act East’ policy, and territorial sensitivities inform its tactical response 
to crises such as Doklam. Especially vis-à-vis Myanmar, existing literature emphasizes 
on competition with China as decisive in shaping India’s foreign policy.8 Though the 
role of domestic and bureaucratic politics is appreciated, these drivers are not 
considered critical.  
This article interrogates the decisiveness of strategic rivalry with China and 
territorial sensitivity as drivers of India’s approach towards Myanmar and juxtaposes 
their criticality against factors such as domestic and bureaucratic politics. It does so by 
                                                        
5  On how Bhutan reacted to the crisis, see Rudra Chaudhuri, ‘Looking for Godot’, Indian Express, 
03/09/2017 
6 ‘India steps-up vigil at Walong tri-junction’, The Hindu, 01/04/2018 
7  On China-Myanmar relations see David Steinberg and Hongwei Fan, Modern China-Myanmar 
Relations: Dilemmas of Mutual Dependence (Singapore: NIAS Press, 2012); on Act East Policy see 
Isabelle Saint-Mezard, ‘India’s Act East Policy: Strategic Implications for the Indian Ocean’, Journal of 
Indian Ocean Region, 12 (2), 2016, 177-190   
8 Lack of substantial relations between the two countries due to the Tatmadaw’s inward-looking policies, 
its anti-India predilection, and India’s own preference for a democratic political system in Myanmar, are 
other facets outlined in this literature. For more on India’s Myanmar policy see: Sunniva Engh, ‘India’s 
Myanmar Policy and the ‘Sino-India Great Game’’, Asian Affairs, 47 (1), 32-58; Marie Lall, ‘Indo-
Myanmar Relations in the Era of Pipeline Diplomacy’, Contemporary Southeast Asia, 28 (3), December 
2006, 424-446; B Pakem, India-Burma Relations (New Delhi: Omsons Publishers, 1992); Renaud 
Egreteau, Wooing the Generals: India’s New Burma Policy (New Delhi: Authors Press, 2003); Bertil 
Lintner, Great Game East – India, China, and the Struggle for Asia’s Most Volatile Frontier (New Delhi: 
HarperCollins India, 2012); Andrew Selth, ‘Burma and the Strategic Competition between China and 
India’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 19 (2), 1996, 213-230; John W Garver, Protracted Contest: Sino-
Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001) 243-274; Thant 
Myint U, Where China Meets India: Burma and the New Crossroads of Asia (New York: Farrar Straus 
Giroux, 2012); Rajiv Bhatia, India-Myanmar Relations: Changing Contours (New Delhi: Routledge 
India, 2017); Preet Malik, My Myanmar Years: A Diplomat’s Account of India’s Relations with the 
Region (New Delhi: SAGE Publications, 2015); J N Dixit, India’s Foreign Policy and its Neighbours (New 
Delhi: Gyan Publishers, 2015) 323-334; Frederic Grare, India Turns East: International Engagement 
and US-China Rivalry (London: Hurst Publishers, 2017) 91-110      
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studying fresh archival and interview data on the formulation and implementation of 
the 1967 India-Burma Boundary Agreement.9 The empirical puzzle it seeks to decode 
is: why did India seek formalization of its boundary with Burma in early 1967? Given 
its territorial disputes with China (and Pakistan), resolving the boundary issue with 
Burma should have been a priority issue for India. Still, it took New Delhi two decades 
after independence, and five years after the 1962 war, to broach the subject. 
Additionally, once the boundary agreement was signed on paper, both India and 
Burma remained content with territorial ambiguity on the ground. This case is 
important for a variety of reasons. One, it shines historical light on why and how India 
deals with smaller neighbours in the light of its rivalry with China. The agreement is 
unique not just for its timing but also its content and implementation. A three-party 
dispute that involved China, the making of this agreement witnessed interplay between 
recently decolonized states with visible power differentials (i.e. China being most 
powerful, followed by India and Burma respectively), and rivalry between China and 
India after the 1962 Sino-Indian war. The tri-junction, which is still under dispute, 
witnessed heavy fighting between Indian and Chinese troops in November 1962. 10 
Two, similar to Bhutanese concerns about losing territory to China in 2017, Burma was 
concerned about Chinese incursions throughout the 1950s and early 1960s. Unlike 
Bhutan though, Burma signed a boundary agreement with China in October 1960, and 
ratified it in January 1961.11 During Doklam, Bhutan’s strong relationship with India 
was an asset for New Delhi. Burma, however, had given up its claim at the tri-junction 
as part of the 1961 Sino-Burmese Boundary Agreement. Finally, despite the 1967 
agreement, the India-Myanmar border is still contested by local publics residing along 
the boundary, and the China-Myanmar-India tri-junction continues to remain 
disputed. Critically, the case shows how India negotiated between domestic politics 
and foreign policy in 1967 when risk of armed conflict with China was considerably 
higher (skirmishes did break out later that year).   
The article argues that domestic security and bureaucratic politics trumped 
external factors in the making of the boundary agreement. More than India’s rivalry 
                                                        
9 The term ‘Burma’ is used in the article for the pre-1989 phase. For other references, the term ‘Myanmar’ 
is used. 
10 Arjun Subramaniam, India’s Wars: A Military History 1947-1971 (New Delhi: HarperCollins, 2016) 
245-246 
11  United States Government (USG), ‘International Boundary Study – Burma-China Boundary’, The 
Geographer, Office of the Geographer, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, No. 42, 30/11/1964, 
http://fall.fsulawrc.com/collection/LimitsinSeas/IBS042.pdf and Maung Maung, ‘The Burma-China 
Boundary Settlement’, Asian Survey, 1 (1), March 1961, 38-43 
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with China, it was the outbreak of the Mizo insurgency in 1966 (coupled with an 
ongoing Naga insurgency) that pressed India into action to resolve its boundary 
dispute with Burma. The insurgencies were potent enough to make India, bigger of the 
two powers, to willfully cede territory to Burma if needed. Such a move was 
inconceivable at a time when the defeat of 1962 was fresh and losing territory could 
result in political damage for a government in New Delhi. Yet, the combination of 
worsening security situation, a requirement for the state of India to assert its 
administrative presence and demonstrate its distribution potential in its Northeastern 
frontiers, and simultaneous deterioration in Sino-Burmese relations, pushed India to 
formalize the boundary. Moreover, territoriality was far from a zero-sum game for both 
sides, as India was willing to make territorial compromises and ensure unhindered 
flow of people and capital across the border. These finding about the importance of 
domestic politics and security are not necessarily surprising. Nonetheless, they are 
counter-intuitive given the potency of the narrative around Sino-Indian rivalry as the 
core driver of India’s Myanmar policy. They demonstrate that rivalry with China, or 
India’s territorial prickliness, does not adequately explain the reasons for or timing of 
India’s formalization of its boundary with Burma in 1967. True, the strategic 
importance of securing this border given the threat perception from China in the 1960s 
was not lost upon Indian policymakers. The Chinese media reaction to the agreement 
was telling as it blamed Burmese leaders for being a ‘cat’s paw’ of ‘Indian reactionaries’ 
and ramped up anti-Burmese and anti-India propaganda. But the trigger for India’s 
policy change was domestic and not external.  
This case study shows that retrospective explanations of foreign policy output 
risks (over) assuming intentionality and attributing excessive analytical weight on 
visibly obvious geopolitical trends. Understanding the actual policymaking process 
then becomes less important. Hereon, the article is divided into four sections. The first 
section offers a brief historical overview of the how colonialism shaped the contours of 
the India-Myanmar border, and why governments of both countries asserted that the 
1967 agreement only ‘formalized’ a ‘traditional’ boundary. The second section explains 
the immediate context in 1966 and 1967 that pushed Indian policymakers into viewing 
an unsettled boundary with Burma as a ‘problem’ that must be managed with urgency. 
The third section then takes a deep historical dive into why the agreement was signed 
in March 1967, why Indian policymakers bypassed all regional stakeholders in 
Northeast India, how India negotiated the agreement with Rangoon, and how China 
reacted to the same. The fourth and penultimate section offers analytical takeaways 
from this case study, just as the conclusion builds on this analysis to demonstrate the 
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value of domestic forces – sometimes over and above external rivalry – in dictating the 
timing of India’s foreign policy actions vis-à-vis Myanmar.    
 
Colonialism and Territoriality   
 
Territoriality, or the idea of a defined geography over which a state commands 
sovereign control is critical in the study of international politics. 12  In practice, 
territoriality has serious implications for states that struggle to uniformly assert 
authority across recognized borders. Postcolonial states such as India, for instance, 
inherited its territorial construct from the British Raj.13 Such inheritance of colonial 
boundaries implied inheritance of problems associated with them as well. For 
example, the imposition of administrative and physical limits on communities 
historically unburdened by such divisions led to violent friction between the Raj and 
these communities, notably in the Northwest Frontier Province and the Northeast 
Frontier Agency. Often resulting in mutually accepted agreements, these frictions 
ensured that ‘frontier regions’ were beyond the administrative purview of the colonial 
state, and implied compromised levels of imperial sovereignty.14 The history of modern 
India’s international territorial disputes and domestic separatist movements can be 
traced to this colonial period. Continuation of colonial administrative practices by 
independent India in order to deal with separatist resistance is also visible in equal 
measure.15 Sensitive about its existence as a viable state, India’s political leadership 
gave priority to the issue of integrating communities living on the peripheries. 
 
                                                        
12 The concept of territoriality goes beyond just physical geography and encompasses a variety of tangible 
domains (human geography, financial geography and so on). But in this article emphasis remains on 
physical geography. For more on territoriality and IR see J G Ruggie, ‘Territoriality and Beyond: 
Problematizing Modernity in International Relations’, International Organization, 47 (1) Winter 1993, 
139-174; J Strandsbjerg, Territory, Globalization and International Relations: The Cartographic Reality 
of Space (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).  
13 For more on postcolonial states and territoriality see: Jeffrey Herbst, ‘The Creation and Maintenance of 
National Boundaries in Africa’, International Organization, 43 (3), Autumn, 1989, 673-692; James C 
Scott, The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2009); Itty Abraham, How India Became Territorial: Foreign Policy, Diaspora, 
Geopolitics (California: Stanford University Press, 2014)  
14  Sanghamitra Misra, Becoming a Borderland: The Politics of Space and Identity in Colonial 
Northeastern India (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014) 5-13 
15 There have been differences in the way India and Pakistan dealt with separatism in Balochistan and 
North East. See Elisabeth Leake, ‘At the Nation-State’s Edge: Centre-Periphery Relations in Post-1947 
South Asia’, The Historical Journal, March 2016, 1-31 
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Geographical Features of the India-Myanmar Frontier 
 
The India-Myanmar frontier is a virtual wall of jungle-clad mountains 
stretching from the Patkai, the Naga, and the Manipur hills in the north to the Lushai 
and the Chin Hills in the center of the frontier region. A set of narrow and relatively 
low-heighted hills (averaging 7,000 feet), these ranges join the Arakan Yomas in the 
south, which further continues into the maritime sphere and emerge as the Andaman 
Islands in the Bay of Bengal. The India-China-Myanmar borders meet in Myanmar’s 
northernmost region of Kachin state, and the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh. A set 
of parallel ridges and valleys averaging about 100 miles broad, this hilly border is 
difficult to penetrate and has few land routes connecting the two countries. 16 
Demographically, the region is mélange of different linguistic, ethnic, religious, and 
tribal groups. The more prominent communities include the Nagas, the Mizos, the 
Kukis, the Meiteis, the Bodos, and the Assamese on the Indian side, and the Nagas, the 
Kachins and the Chins on the Burmese side. In practice, the border has meant little for 
people living in these areas. However, from a bureaucratic and security perspective, it 
defines the sovereign limits for both Myanmar and India.  
 
The Frontier’s Sociopolitical Dynamics  
 
Historically, three aspects came to define the socio-political dynamics of this 
frontier. First, were the British Raj’s relations with Burma. Much like its northwest 
frontier where the Raj fought various wars with Afghan and Sikh kings, it fought three 
wars with Burma before colonizing it completely in 1885. King Thibaw Min of Burma 
was considered both inept and unfriendly and viewed as a hindrance between easy 
trade access between India and China via Burma. This powerful economic drive to 
‘tame’ Upper Burma (akin to ‘Lower Burma’ which was under British influence) in 
order to access lucrative Chinese markets played a decisive role in the overthrown of 
the king.17 Second, was the Raj’s relations with local powerbrokers in the Northeast, 
such as the Maharaja of Manipur and various Naga tribal leaders, as well as relations 
these powerbrokers had with Burma. Various power brokers in India’s northeast had 
accepted British suzerainty and became princely states under British rule. These small 
kingdoms had traditionally been at odds with the Burmese who had invaded Assam 
                                                        
16 R Kozicki, India and Burma, 1937-1957: A Study in International Relations (unpublished doctoral 
thesis, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1959) 6-8 
17 Thant Myint-U, The Making of Modern Burma. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) 186-
189 
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and Manipur in early nineteenth century before being defeated comprehensively by 
the British in the First Anglo-Burmese war (1824-1826). Following the British victory, 
a formal agreement about the frontier was signed in 1826 in Yandabo. The Treaty of 
Yandabo ended the war and led to the ceding of Assam (annexed by Burma in 1821), 
Manipur including the Kabaw Valley (annexed by Burma in 1813), Arakan (now 
Rakhine, annexed by Burma in 1784), and the Tenasserim (Taninthayi) coast south of 
the Salween River to the British victors. 18  The Burmese were forced to cease 
‘interference’ in the Cachar and Jaintia Hills District, pay an indemnity of £1 million 
in four installments, exchange diplomatic representatives between Ava and Calcutta, 
and sign a commercial treaty. 19  The indemnity payment that crippled Burma 
financially coupled with loss of territory, began a slow but sure process of popular 
antipathy against the British. Not surprisingly, the two issues that preoccupied the 
British Resident in Burma included (a) the payment of indemnity, and (b) boundary 
demarcation in the frontier region where raids by armed Burmese bands became 
routine affairs.20  Conversely, Assam and Manipur became assertive in demanding 
(unsuccessfully) more territorial and financial concessions from Burma with British 
help.  
Apart from debates and disagreements over which village or cluster of villages 
belonged to Assam and Manipur or Burma, dispute over the Kabaw Valley became a 
serious diplomatic issue. In order to assuage protests, the valley was ceded in its 
entirety to Burma in January 1834, and the British Indian government promised to 
pay Rupees 6,000 yearly to the Maharaja of Manipur as compensation for property 
lost. Yet, disputes over forestry rights and raids across this border ensued, prompting 
colonial authorities to begin demarcating the boundary in 1880. A portion of the 
boundary was demarcated in 1882, and the rest (between boundary pillars, or BPs, 1 
and 39) was completed in 1896, with the border lying at the eastern foot of the chain 
of mountains that rose immediately from the western side of the Kabaw Valley. 21 
Though agreeable to the Burmese the boundary on the ground allegedly bereaved 
Manipur of large tracts of teak forests and, as forcefully stated by the Maharaja in 1926, 
it differed considerably from the terms of Agreement in 1834.22 Citing that he was a 
                                                        
18 Maung Htin Aung, A History of Burma (New York and London: Cambridge University Press, 1967) 214-
215  
19 Ibid  
20 W S Desai, History of the British Residency in Burma, 1826-1840 (Yangon: Rangoon University, 1939) 
10-23     
21 MEA, SECRET, Naravana Rao to Additional Secretary, 26/08/1974, D1692/DDHDIII/74, NAI 
22 Ibid, 3 
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‘minor’ in 1896 to credibly assess the degree of ‘injustice’ against the people of Manipur 
during the demarcation process, he wanted to ‘reopen the boundary question’. Not only 
was such a demand ‘intolerable’ to the Government of Burma, it failed to impress the 
British as well. The central government was concerned that reopening the boundary 
question in Manipur could lead to similar demands in other sectors potentially 
unsettling the border. Rejection of Manipuri demands by the British set a precedent 
wherein regional advocacy on the boundary issue were suppressed or bypassed 
completely by central governments in independent India. This dialectic between 
colonial expansion with local collaboration and resistance not only defined British 
India’s relations with Burma, but also shaped the interaction between independent 
India and Burma on one hand and that between local power-holders in the frontier 
region on the other. Thus, the contours of the boundary, as viewed by either side, were 
representative of this multi-leveled political push-and-pull; and continue to remain so 
till today.  
 
Post-Independence Politics in Northeast India 
 
Soon after independence, the two countries signed a Treaty of Friendship in 
1951 and developed close ties on a range of issues including the Non-Alignment 
movement. The problem of Indian migrants in Burma, and rice trade, were top 
priority.23 Though the border areas remained un-administered and mostly violent, 
they were not high up the political agenda. This was despite the fact that (a) both 
Burma and India had a boundary dispute with China, (b) they shared a tri-junction at 
the northern most extremity of the boundary, and (c) people in Naga Hills had opposed 
becoming part of India and launched the Free Naga Movement that operated on both 
sides of the border. It was not long before frontier violence became intense enough to 
require active governmental intervention. In 1951, people from the Pennu village 
                                                        
23 During the colonial period, the ruling British authorities migrated many Indians to work in Burma. 
These people, who came from Tamil Nadu, Bengal, and other parts of the subcontinent, eventually came 
to dominate Burma’s economy. This economic migration and the resulting inequalities generated 
discontentment among locals and led to many rounds of anti-Indian riots in Burma before and after 
independence. In 1962, General Ne Win began a nationalization drive that essentially broke the back of 
Indian traders, landowners, and agricultural workers, forcing them to leave the country on short notice. 
The exodus of Indians from Burma throughout the 1960s became a huge diplomatic issue between the 
two countries. As for rice trade, Burma was the largest supplier of rice to India. The exodus of Indians 
working in paddy fields had a direct impact on Burma’s potential to grow and export rice. At the same 
time, India itself was facing acute food shortages and required more – not less – of rice imports from 
Burma. For more, see Kozicki, India and Burma, 1-50 
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Burma raided an Indian Naga village called Nomyu. They took 93 ‘heads’ as trophies, 
burnt nearly 400 houses, and looted grains and livestock.24 Active intervention from 
local administrations settled the dispute with the clause that the inhabitants of Pennu 
will pay a compensation of Rupees 15,000/- in kind to inhabitants of Nomyu.25 Such 
occurrences were common across the region. Instead of resolving the issue, India’s first 
PM Jawaharlal Nehru downplayed their importance saying that such incidents were 
unrelated to both the boundary issue and with the Free Naga Movement.26 They were: 
‘disputes more or less of family type, i.e. between one clan and another’.27 Unable to 
find a lasting solution for such issues, India and Burma agreed ‘to ‘keep a fatherly eye’ 
on this un-administered area.28 India’s defeat in the 1962 Sino-India war impacted the 
way New Delhi viewed its strategic landscape. Not only did it come to appreciate its 
vulnerabilities in the frontier regions, it also became aware of the possibility of a Sino-
Pakistan axis to exploit these vulnerabilities. This was most visible in the support these 
countries gave to the increasingly violent Naga insurgency throughout the 1960s.29 
Friendly relations with Rangoon were required to ensure support on the Naga issue as 
well as in dealing with China. For its part, Burma had signed a boundary treaty with 
China in October 1960 and with Pakistan in 1964. These settlements increased 
pressure on India to resolve its own boundary issue with Rangoon. Still, it took India 
another five years to propose the formalization of the boundary. The next section 
explains why.   
 
Formalizing the Boundary  
 
There were three axes along which the situation developed. One, bilaterally, 
India’s relations with Burma improved after a hiatus after 1962 (due to the Sino-Indian 
war and the military coup in Burma). Two, domestically, the security situation in 
Northeast worsened. Three, regionally, India’s relations with both China and Pakistan 
remained poor. All these aspects created an environment for India to take the lead and 
propose the formalization of the boundary in 1966. The perils of an un-demarcated 
                                                        
24 Parliamentary Debates (HP), Part I, 2 (43), 17/04/1954 
25 Ibid 
26 Parliamentary Debates (HP), Part I, 2 (3), 01/07/1952 
27 Ibid 
28 MEA, UNCLASSIFIED, ‘Joint Border Meeting between Deputy Commissioner, Naga Hills (Burma) and 
Assistant Political Officer, Konyak Sub-Division’, 07/03/1953, NAI  
29  Marcus Franke, War and Nationalism in South Asia: The Indian State and the Nagas (London: 
Routledge, 2009) 107-109   
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boundary with Burma were evident to the Indian leadership since the defeat of 1962. 
Ensuring territorial security required resolving outstanding boundary disputes with 
smaller neighbours. Yet, there is no evidence that the issue was discussed with the 
visiting Burmese head of state and military dictator General Ne Win and his wife in 
February 1965. His first to India since the military coup in 1962, Ne Win’s visit 
highlighted that a change in leadership in New Delhi had paved way for improvement 
in bilateral ties. Till then, Nehru’s ill-health and a lack of rapport with Ne Win, coupled 
with U Nu’s unceremonious ouster had prevented fruitful dialogue on most pressing 
bilateral issues including the exodus of Indian workers. Ne Win’s ‘neutral’ 
participation in the Colombo Powers meeting in 1962 to resolve the Sino-Indian border 
dispute did not help the cause either. Rangoon’s failure to condemn Chinese actions 
distressed India even if New Delhi tried utilizing the Colombo Powers’ proposals to 
reach a settlement with China. Moreover, by mid-1964, the bonhomie between China 
and Burma had faded. Ne Win was unhappy by Chinese support to the Burmese 
‘White-Flag’ Communists whereas the Chinese were unimpressed by Ne Win’s 
‘Burmese Way to Socialism’.30 Improving relations with India resonated in Rangoon. 
The 1965 visit was important for both countries.  
 
India-Burma Bilateral Relations 
 
The core purpose of the visit, from India’s perspective, was to warm-up with Ne 
Win since the hiatus of 1962. Speeches of the two heads of state underlined that they 
truly were seeking to ‘renew’ old ties despite differences.31 A variety of issues ranging 
from the situation in Indochina, non-alignment, and nuclear test ban treaty, to 
bilateral relations were discussed.32 Though there is no evidence of India bringing up 
the boundary issue, the visit convinced officials that Ne Win wanted to develop friendly 
relations.33  Ne Win’s friendliness during the visit became a driver in pushing the 
formalization of the boundary in 1966-67.34 By this time the issue of Naga ‘hostiles’ 
crossing into Burmese territory and visiting China, only to return home to foment 
separatist violence, was high on India’s national agenda. In December 1965, a month 
before his demise, PM Lal Bahadur Shastri visited Burma. The focus of this visit was 
                                                        
30 Robert Taylor, General Ne Win: A Political Biography (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2015) 309-315 
31  MEA, Foreign Affairs Records, ‘President's Speech at Dinner in honour of General Ne Win’, 
05/02/1965.  
32 MEA, FAR, ‘Joint Communique on General No Win's Visit’, 12/02/1965  
33 Cabinet Secretariat, SECRET, ‘Demarcation of Indo-Burma Border’, Joshi to MEA, 04/01/1967, NAI 
34 Ibid 
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on the condition of the Persons of Indian Origin and their (mis)treatment by Burma. 
The boundary issue itself did not merit attention. Notably, the two leaders also did not 
talk about Naga separatism. The Nagas, engaged in a fractured dialogue with New 
Delhi at that point, routinely crossed into Burma.35 When asked in the parliament on 
March 01, 1966 as to why this issue was not discussed, the government argued that it 
was India’s an ‘internal matter’.36 Shastri’s untimely death in January 1966 and the 
ascendance of Indira Gandhi, Nehru’s daughter, did not stem the momentum of 
bilateral talks. In mid-1965, Gandhi’s private secretary visited Burma to secure a 
supply of 80,000 tons of rice as a gesture of friendship and laid the ground for 
continuous dialogue.37  
 
Situation in the Northeast  
 
On the second, domestic axis, on the same day when the government defended 
non-inclusion of the Naga issue in talks with Ne Win, the Mizo National Front made a 
declaration of independence from India and launched a series of attacks across the 
town of Aizawl. The Indian military counter-attack forced nearly 1,000 insurgents to 
cross the border into Burma. 38  Four weeks later, EAM Swaran Singh told the 
Parliament that such an act by the Mizos made the government ‘unhappy’ because – 
‘[it] may create some problem for our friendly neighbour Burma with whom we will 
co-operate fully for taking suitable steps to cope with this act of the Mizos’.39 The Mizo 
insurgency had begun, and the issue had ceased to be strictly internal. Seeking Burma’s 
assistance in such a scenario was a critical security requirement. The opposition 
regularly questioned the government on the level of such cooperation. On August 08, 
1965, for instance, Rishang Keishing, a Congress MP from Manipur, quizzed the 
government on how exactly Burma was cooperating in dealing with the Nagas and the 
Mizos. The government cryptically responded that India was receiving ‘friendly 
cooperation’ from Burma in preventing underground Nagas and Mizos from using 
Burmese ‘territory as a corridor for crossing over to Pakistan or as a sanctuary’.40 The 
two sides, Keishing was informed, had begun discussing measures of ‘mutual interest 
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to be adopted along the border, in this connection’.41 India had secured the repatriation 
of some 657 Mizos by early August already, and put them up in camps in Assam.42 Such 
Burmese support was coupled with proactive border patrolling by Indian forces. Both 
the underground Nagas and the Mizos were now crossing into Burma and harassing 
Indian forces. The inadequacy of Indian state’s coercive arm to stem violence 
underlined India’s loss of sovereign control in these regions. And the ease with which 
insurgents moved in and out of what was considered Indian territory, highlighted the 
meaninglessness of the ‘traditional boundary’ between India and Burma. 
That the situation in Northeast not only required coordination with Burma but 
also clear territorial limits became a pressing concern. On August 02, 1966, 
parliamentarians called attention of the house to ‘a matter of urgent public 
importance’.43 Burmese border forces had shot at Manipuri tribesmen near Moreh, 
killing one and injuring several in two separate incidents. Burma claimed that the 
tribesmen had entered their territory and did not surrender to Burmese forces when 
challenged. Home Minister Gulzarilal Nanda faced tough questions in the parliament 
regarding the incidents, why they occurred, and what help Burma was offering India. 
Nanda was emphatic that Burmese forces supported India by capturing and returning 
Naga and Mizo ‘hostiles’ but was unable to explain why certain parts of Indian territory 
were viewed as Burmese by the other side. When parliamentarians asked whether the 
India-Burma boundary had been properly demarcated with boundary pillars, Nanda 
quickly responded: ‘It has been demarcated’.44 Given that no formal process had begun 
on this issue this was probably a ‘soft lie’ to ensure maneuvering space for the 
government. The incident firmly indicated that Burmese support on the Naga and Mizo 
issues, though important, was not adequate to resolve outstanding border issues. It 
also highlighted that occurrence of such incidents came with political costs for the state 
and national level leadership and risked undermining India’s image as a state that 
could credibly defend its citizens living on the periphery.  
On October 01, 1966, the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), then operating 
within the ‘Intelligence Wing’ of the Cabinet Secretariat (that became India’s premier 
external intelligence agency in 1968 i.e. the Research and Analysis Wing, or R&AW), 
                                                        
41 Ibid 
42 3rd LSD, 15th Session, ‘Repatriation of Mizos from Burma’, 01/08/1966 
43 3rd LSD, 15th Session, ‘Firing by Burmese Customs Personnel on Indian Baite Tribesmen’, 02/08/1966 
44 Ibid 
 14 
offered a sobering assessment of the situation along the border in a secret report.45 The 
committee emphasized that India’s eastern and northeastern frontiers strategically 
and politically ‘very sensitive’. In particular, the three major movements for an 
independent Nagaland, a sovereign Mizoland, and a greater Chinland were ‘threats to 
the territorial integrity of India’.46 It presciently forewarned that the Mizo National 
Front had gained and influence since the start of the year and was likely to turn violent. 
The chairman of the committee argued that there were indications of ‘transborder 
tribal unity’ among the Burmese and India Nagas as well as the Mizos and the Chins, 
who had signed a written agreement to this effect. 47  The JIC was confident that 
proactive counter-measures by the Burmese military will weaken the Chin insurgents 
and reduce the salience of the Mizo-China alliance. For this to happen, however, New 
Delhi needed General Ne Win’s support. The intelligence report ended on a somber 
note:  
 
‘The paragraphs above show that the situation in the Eastern and North Eastern 
tribal areas of India is more serious than when the JIC made its previous 
assessment in February, 1966. Unless quick and effective action is taken, violent 
movements are likely to develop on a larger scale. Both Pakistan and China will 
encourage and assist such movements against the integrity and security of India.’48    
 
By late 1966, the need to clearly demarcate the boundary had become a pressing 
requirement as a variety of domestic issues became aligned: (a) the need to assert 
statehood and territorial limits on a dissenting populace (at a time when India’s 
domestic borders were also being reorganized), (b) display that India could provide 
livelihood and security to its citizens living at border areas, and (c) ironically, securing 
support from Burma to contain the Naga and Mizo insurgencies.  
 
India’s relations with China and Pakistan  
 
The third factor was India’s relations with China and Pakistan. The 1962 defeat 
from China was very fresh, and so was the 1965 stalemate with Pakistan. Both these 
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neighbours escalated support for the Naga and Mizo insurgencies. By August 1966, 
India was convinced that Pakistan was supporting the Nagas and Mizos from East 
Pakistan. 49  It accused Pakistan and China of interfering in its domestic affairs in 
national and international platforms and considered Pakistani president Ayub Khan’s 
‘denial’ of such support as an obvious ‘defensive act’.50  Given India’s links with a 
variety of Bengali nationalists in East Pakistan, the Pakistani leadership viewed 
support to Northeast insurgents as a ‘tit-for-tat’ model of paying India back.51 For 
China, it was continuation of its coercive strategy since 1959 when India gave shelter 
to the Dalai Lama. Both Naga and Mizo rebels received training and military supplies 
in Yunnan, where they reached by crossing Burma.52 Since 1962, China had countered 
India not just militarily but also diplomatically and pushed the line that India was an 
expansionist and aggressive state akin to the British imperialists and was incapable of 
resolving boundary disputes peacefully. Such Chinese pressure had generated 
sufficient concern in India about a potential Chinese military attack via Burma. Ved 
Prakash Malik, then a mid-ranking army officer working on Northeast and Burma (and 
who later became the Chief of Army Staff), remembers that the Indian army ‘took the 
threat of a Chinese invasion via Burma very seriously’.53 Not just India, even the US 
policymakers were worries about China opening a front against India via Burma. On 
23 May 1963, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), drafted a secret report titled 
‘Chinese Communist capabilities for attacking India through Burmese territory’.54 One 
of the main assumptions of the report was: ‘the government of Burma would not resist 
the movement of Chinese forces across Burmese territory and would acquiesce in the 
utilization by the Chinese of Burmese transportation facilities and airfield along the 
routes of advance’.55 In November 1964, the US Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) 
prepared an even more detailed 30-page dossier on the same issue.56 It highlighted 
that there were only two routes by which China could move through Burma to attack 
India i.e. (a) Kunming-Guwahati/Tezpur via Mandalay and Imphal, and (b) Kunming-
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Dibrugarh via Myitkyina and Ledo.57 The only difference between the 1963 CIA and 
1964 DIA dossier was that the latter did not take Burmese acquiescence for granted, 
but was convinced that any resistance by Burmese forces will be ‘swept aside’.58  
Though preparation of such assessments is part of intelligence and military 
activities, that the CIA and DIA would go to such lengths in gauging the practicalities 
of a Chinese incursion into India via Burma demonstrates that the situation in the mid-
1960s may have been similar to what India faced at Doklam in 2017. Resolving the 
boundary with Burma, in this context, was a low-hanging fruit for India. The only 
serious issue was the China-Burma-India tri-junction in the northern sector of the 
boundary. A 5-½ mile patch in present day Arunachal Pradesh, agreeing on this 
particular stretch required coordination with and acceptance of China. This was as 
unlikely in 1966, as it remains in 2018. China had resolved its boundary with Burma 
by ratifying the border treaty in January 1961.59 Much to India’s annoyance, U Nu had 
presented the treaty as a format that India could emulate.60 The tri-junction was kept 
‘provisional’ in the Sino-Burmese treaty so as not to upset India and continued to 
remain disputed territory for both China and India. In 1959, the Indian and Burmese 
premiers had met to coordinate strategy regarding border settlement with China and 
had jointly agreed that they will remain firm on demarcation along the McMahon 
Line.61 Though Burma was able to solve its own border issues with China in 1961, the 
issue led to war for India in 1962. In light of these developments, Beijing’s reaction to 
an India-Burma boundary agreement was likely to influence Burmese decision-
making. This aspect was not lost on Indian policymakers when they started preparing 
the ground for the boundary agreement. Either way, by late 1966, as the bilateral 
relations between Burma and India improved, the situation in Northeast worsened, 
and relations with China and Pakistan remained strained, New Delhi decided to move 
ahead.   
 
Making of the Agreement 
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On December 29, 1966, the MEA pitched the boundary agreement to the 
‘Secretaries’ Committee on Foreign Affairs’ for political clearance. Four days later the 
Committee met and approved the proposal. Cabinet Secretary D S Joshi, who had been 
forewarned by the JIC about how precarious the situation truly was, informed the MEA 
that though the committee agreed that the Indo-Burma border did not present any 
serious challenge ‘at present’, it was a good idea to ‘have the border demarcated in 
agreement with the Burmese government as early as possible so that it may not in 
future become a crisis’. 62  The committee wanted to seize the moment in view of 
General Ne Win’s ‘very friendly attitude towards India’; a fact that could change any 
moment given how top-down decision-making was under the military. The committee 
noted Burma’s anxieties about external interference in their domestic affairs and 
suggested caution on India’s part. Joshi was emphatic that the Indian team should not 
‘rush the Burmese who have natural suspicion of undertaking formal obligations’. In 
order to impress the other side about the usefulness and advantage of demarcating the 
border, the Cabinet Secretary took pains to highlight the ‘way forward’. As a first step, 
an informal (yet deliberate) approach was recommended, ‘preferably in the course of 
discussions on other issues’.63 This was to be done by any officer accompanying the 
foreign minister in the latter’s forthcoming visit to Indonesia, wherein the officer could 
return ‘via Rangoon’.64 As this was a national boundary, there was no mention of 
consulting official and other stakeholders in the region about the boundary. In fact, 
this non-inclusion of Northeastern states became a problem after the agreement was 
signed and during the demarcation phase. In January 1967, instead of sending a mid-
level diplomat, the external affairs minister M C Chagla himself visited Burma and met 
with Ne Win to discuss the matter and successfully sought the general’s approval.65 
Joshi and Chagla’s approach towards the issue underlined India’s appreciation of 
Burmese anxieties and the importance of the boundary issue for India. R D Katari, 
India’s ambassador in Rangoon noted that despite ‘excellent’ discussions, ‘in deference 
to Burmese susceptibilities’ no joint communique was issued after Chagla’s visit.66 
What was more important, Katari said, was that: ‘It became evident (as indeed we had 
suspected all along) that Ne Win’s main concern in the foreign field at the moment is 
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to utilise the growing USSR-USA pressure on China’.67 With Sino-Burmese relations 
on a decline, Indian overtures were welcomed in Rangoon.  
What truly highlighted India’s strong desire to strike the agreement, however, 
was its willingness to cede territory to Burma if required and wherever possible without 
incurring heavy political cost. For a country that had lost territory in 1962 to China and 
saw it as national shame, this was a bold step. If such planned territorial concessions 
risked national outcry, they guaranteed pushback from the states. In his secret letter 
to the MEA, Joshi expressly mentioned that the Secretaries’ Committee on Foreign 
Affairs accepted that ‘India should be prepared, in keeping with our friendly relations 
with Burma, to show a sense of accommodation and if necessary, give in on small 
demands that might be put forward by Burma during the course of the negotiations’ – 
even if that risked pushback from national and state level groups.68 When quizzed by 
the opposition in the parliament in June 1967 on whether India did lose any territory 
to Burma, Chagla categorically rejected the concern.69  Technically he was correct, 
because the two sides had just reached an agreement without demarcating the 
boundary using border pillars on the ground. On February 17, 1967, the Indian 
delegation led by K M Kannampilly from the MEA, and constituting members from the 
ministries of defence, home, and education, as well as the Survey of India, reached 
Rangoon to enter formal negotiations.70 Both sides agreed that there was no ‘dispute’ 
regarding the border. Then, a map was drawn and initialed and the boundary drawn 
and accepted. This boundary on the map proceeded on two bases i.e. there were some 
sectors in which recent official notifications between the two sides firmed the 
boundary. In other sectors, it remained undefined (or was ‘traditional’ as Chagla 
termed it to the public).71 All these sectors were to be jointly patrolled and delimited 
by the newly formed Joint Boundary Commission. 
 
Dispute over the location of the tri-junction 
 
The 906 miles boundary was divided into five main sectors most of which had 
two or more subsectors. These were: sector A-B signifying boundary of the Mizo 
District of Assam with Burma; sector B-D between Manipur and Burma; sector D-F 
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between Nagaland and Burma; sector F-J between the Tirap Frontier Division of 
Assam and the Naga Hills District of Burma; and sector J-K between Lohit Frontier 
Division and the Myitkyina District (see Map 1). 72  All these sectors were to be 
demarcated using numbered boundary pillars (BP). Expectedly, ‘difficulty’ arose 
between the two sides regarding the northernmost J-K sector at the China-Burma-
India tri-junction. 
 
 
 
 Map 1: India-Myanmar Border73 
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According to Indian officials, the boundary in the northernmost sector J-K ran 
along the watershed between the Bhramaputra and the Irrawaddy rivers and joined 
the ridge forming the India-China boundary north of Di Chu River that was treated as 
the tri-junction by India.74 Though the 1914 McMahon Line maps on 1”: 8 miles scale 
identified this point at the Diphu Pass, survey operations in 1918-20 established that 
the watershed ran further north and met the Irrawaddy watershed at a point 5-miles 
northeast of Diphu Pass. By 1922 the tri-junction was rectified officially on the maps. 
Article V of the 1960 Sino-Burmese Boundary Treaty highlighted the western section 
of the boundary as running along the watershed between the Tulung (Taron) river and 
the Tsayul (Sayul) river on one hand, and along upper tributaries of the Irrawaddy on 
the other.75 The attached maps, as Indian officials noted, however, showed the Sino-
Burmese boundary ending at the Diphu Pass.76 During the Sino-Burmese Agreement 
proceedings India issued a note to both parties asserting that the ‘delineation of the 
Sino-Burmese boundary’ in its the western-most sector should not end at Diphu Pass 
but five miles north of it’.77 Nehru noted in February 1961 that Burma had clarified 
that: ‘they were not accepting the interpretation of the map [and] that was none of their 
business, that was a business for India and China to determine, and they are bound to 
keep the terms of their own treaty and their own boundary. So, they adopted a perfectly 
straightforward attitude in this matter’.78 The Chinese reaction was different. Not only 
did they oppose the Indian interpretation of the tri-junction, but also held that India 
misread China’s agreement with Burma.79 After a few exchanges, the Chinese Foreign 
Ministry issued a strong letter to New Delhi on August 06, 1961, saying:  
 
The Indian government continues to insist in its Note on its misinterpretation of 
the Sino-Burmese Boundary Treaty and the attached maps, arbitrarily asserting 
that the Treaty and the attached maps had defined Diphu Pass as the Western 
extremity of the Sino-Burmese boundary. An exhaustive answer to this was already 
made by the Chinese Government in its memorandum of February 21, 1961, and its 
Note of May 04, 1961, pointing out clearly that the Sino-Burmese Treaty had not 
defined the location of the western extremity, i.e. the tri-junction of China, Burma, 
and India and that this was because China and India still differ in their 
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understanding of the eastern section of the Sino-Indian boundary and a settlement 
through negotiations was yet to be achieved.80 
 
This response made it clear that regardless of how China and Burma 
determined the tri-junction in letter, in spirit, or on a map, the bigger and more 
pressing problem, from the Chinese viewpoint, was India’s intransigence. The question 
for the Indian leadership in 1967 was whether Burma will support the Indian claim on 
the tri-junction or not. Though the weakest of all three players, Rangoon’s decision on 
this issue was critical from a legal and political standpoint. Endorsement of the Indian 
claim promised to put India on a stronger diplomatic footing vis-à-vis China. Given the 
history of coordination between Burma and India on the boundary issue, there was 
hope in New Delhi that it could garner Burmese support on the issue. However, as the 
Indian team realised during the negotiations, the Burmese, understandably so, ‘did not 
want to appear to be taking sides in the dispute between India and China regarding the 
exact location of the northern extremity’.81 Similar to their stand with China in 1961, 
they stuck to a fiercely ‘neutral’ position with India as well.  
Burma suggested that the northernmost sector of the boundary should be ‘left 
out of description’.82 Though ostensibly neutral, such a stand risked compromising 
India’s position further vis-à-vis China on the territorial dispute. As pushback, the 
Indian delegation highlighted that Chou Enlai had admitted before the Chinese 
National Congress that the Diphu Pass was the tri-junction indeed.83 If the Chinese felt 
aggrieved, they should take the matter up with India and Burma in a normal way 
adopted in such circumstances. When this information also failed to convince the 
Burmese delegation, India bluntly pointed out that, ‘the correspondence exchanged 
between the Prime Minister of India and Burma had signified the acceptance of the tri-
junction north of Diphu Pass, and this had been reiterated by India after the signing of 
the Sino-Burmese boundary treaty in 1961’.84 A member of the Indian delegation later 
highlighted in a secret note to the Cabinet Secretary, it took considerable ‘high-level’ 
pressure from India to convince Burma into agreeing to at least define this sector.85 
Burma pressed that since the Western extremity of the Burma-China boundary had 
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been kept vague, the northern extremity of the India-Burma boundary should also be 
kept vague.86 The Burmese proposed to articulate the tri-junction as such: 
 
The boundary between Burma and India from Shawngshan Bum shall run along 
the watershed between the Irrawaddy and the Bhramaputra River systems to its 
northern extremity, the site of which extremity will remain provisional pending the 
final determination.87  
 
The emphasis on Shawngshan Bum by Burma essentially confirmed the 
Chinese claims on the line instead of helping India. After some back-and-forth and 
more pressure from India, the two sides finally agreed to:  
 
Thence [the boundary runs] along the watershed between the Irrawaddy and the 
Brahmaputra river system to its northern extremity, the exact location of which 
northern extremity will remain provisional pending to its final determination.88 
 
China’s Reaction 
 
According to the Chinese press, Beijing issued a memorandum to the 
‘reactionary Ne Win … seriously warning’ against the boundary agreement with India 
while the Indian delegation was in Rangoon.89 The New China News Agency (Xinhua) 
was quick to brand Ne Win as a ‘cat’s paw of Indian reactionaries’ and threatened 
‘counter-attack’ against his conspiracy to ‘occupy ... large tracts of Chinese territory’.90 
With Chinese pressure building, Burma was keen on extricating itself from the dispute 
and conveyed India its willingness to give up territorial claim north of the Diphu Pass. 
This essentially made the exact location of the tri-junction a Sino-Indian problem 
instead of a three-party dispute.91 The two sides accepted to show the tri-junction at 
Diphu Pass on maps similar to the Chinese maps. As per an Indian delegate, this was 
fair game. It did not compromise India’s claim to the northern extremity beyond the 
Diphu Pass because both the Sino-Burmese and the Indo-Burmese agreements 
recognised that the boundary in the Diphu Pass area lay along the Sayul-Irrawaddy 
                                                        
86 DHD to JS (S), 06/03/1976, NAI 
87 Ibid 
88 MEA, Text of the Agreement on International Boundary with Burma, 10/03/1967: 
http://mea.gov.in/bilateral-
documents.htm?dtl/5886/Agreement+on+International+Boundary+with+India 
89 Quoted in B Pakem, India-Burma Relations, 113 
90 Quoted in Ibid 
91 4th LSD, 2nd Session, ‘Statement re. India-Burma Boundary Agreement’, 13/06/1967 
 23 
watershed and the Lohit-Irrawaddy watershed.92 Moreover, India’s claim conformed 
to the ‘highest watershed principle’ based on which the McMahon Line had been drawn 
in the first place, and that had been accepted by China in their agreement with 
Burma.93 The boundary agreement was signed on March 10, 1967, and ratified on May 
30. It was agreed that the demarcation process would begin from the southernmost 
extremity and move northwards. As an Indian delegate noted that, ‘finally, by signing 
this Agreement with the Government of Burma we have given the lie to the Chinese 
accusation that India is not willing to formally delimit its borders with any of her 
neighbours in a peaceful manner”.94 Without consulting any regional stakeholder in 
the Northeast, or speaking with China with whom India had frosty relations, the 
central government under Indira Gandhi, formalized the India-Burma boundary.  
 
Analytical Takeaways 
 
The making of this agreement offers counter-intuitive results. One, despite the 
potency of systemic factors such as inter-state rivalry, domestic politics trumped in 
influencing the substance and timing of India’s decision-making. Indeed, stiff 
negotiations over the tri-junction make the argument that this agreement was India’s 
response to its frosty ties with China tempting. Ne Win’s strained relations with Beijing 
and his opening up to India since 1965 lends credence to this line of analysis. However, 
the China factor, though present and strategically important, did not drive India’s 
outreach to Burma on the boundary question at that particular point in time. As the 
letter by the Cabinet Secretary to the MEA and parliamentary debates highlight, a spike 
in cross-border violence, Burma’s coercive handling of the situation, and outbreak of 
the Mizo insurgency in concert with an ongoing Naga separatist movement made India 
propose the boundary agreement to Rangoon. All these issues were firmly related to 
domestic politics and security and were viewed as portents of an impending diplomatic 
crisis with Burma. Though both domestic and external drivers were important, it was 
the former that was pivotal strategically and temporally in 1966. As R Khathing, head 
of the Indian team in the joint boundary commission reminded his Burmese 
counterparts in 1973, the demarcation was being done to ‘avoid any future confusion 
or misunderstanding of territorial jurisdiction’.95 The fact that India was willing to 
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make territorial concessions to Burma in order to resolve the boundary issue betrayed 
that the pressures generated by multiple separatist insurgencies and border incidents 
on a state with a weak hold over its periphery. Though Indian and Chinese forces 
engaged in another brutal skirmish at Nathu La and Cho La near Sikkim in September 
and October 1967, there was no such military pressure at the Burma tri-junction.96 
Two, the process of territorial delimitation for India and Burma was far from 
being a zero-sum game where the loss of one was viewed as an unsavory gain for the 
other (despite India’s territorial sensitivities). India, the bigger of two powers and a 
state that had recently lost territory to China in 1962, was ready to cede territory to 
Burma. Not just territory, both states were willing to negotiate their sovereign 
authority over citizens living in the frontier areas (till the time, more or less, the exact 
boundary was known and formalized). This was visible in the meetings that Indian and 
Burmese officials undertook with people straddling along the border areas to jointly 
address administrative issues. India’s willingness to cede territory to, and coordinate 
administrative issues with, Burma was rooted in the Indian state’s desire to expand 
and deepen its footprint in the Northeast, and to be able to cater for the well being of 
a definite citizenry. Such internal push for state-building and domestic security (more 
than geopolitical realpolitik calculus) led India to delimit its boundary with Burma in 
1967 on the one hand, but also allowed space for territorial ambiguity in the light of 
regional and local dissent on the other. All three sides, China included, chose territorial 
ambiguity at the tri-junction over a military standoff. This remains to be the case till 
today, even though India and China have steadily militarized the tri-junction since 
early 2018.97  
Three, more than opposition from China, it was domestic discontent over the 
formalization of the boundary that concerned Indian policymakers most. On June 13, 
1967, the Minister of State for External Affairs, Surinder Pal Singh stated: “the 
Agreement [was] only the first step. The Joint Boundary Commission to be appointed 
by the two Governments will proceed to have the boundary demarcated on the ground. 
The Commission will also prepare the draft of a Boundary Treaty to be signed by India 
and Burma. That will be the final act in the friendship to transform this traditional 
border between the two friendly neighbouring countries into a fully delineated and 
demarcated boundary.98 Such a treaty never came about. Soon after Singh laid the 
statement in the parliament, he vacated the floor for Chagla to ‘take questions’ on the 
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issue. Hem Barua, a prominent Assamese poet and parliamentarian challenged that in 
1961 Burma had assured India of revising the ‘provisional agreement’ over the tri-
junction with China once an agreement was reached with India (this was not the case 
in fact). 99  Rangoon’s neutrality, and India’s acceptance of the same, according to 
Barua, meant that: ‘we [India] are sacrificing our land’.100 When Chagla responded 
with the classic quip i.e. ‘we are not sacrificing an inch of our land’, Barua’s riposte was 
sharp: ‘how many miles make an inch?’ Most people in Northeast India viewed the 
boundary as an imperial and unjust imposition falsely dividing communities. It was 
unlikely that any state-government in the Northeast would have agreed to what India 
had on offer for Burma i.e. territorial concessions, however small and strategically 
inconsequential. Conceding territory was a deeply emotive issue for local populace 
sensitive about the history of Burmese invasions, as well as for national leaders who 
still felt humiliated by the 1962 defeat. Gandhi offered the Agreement as a fait accompli 
(an ‘international commitment’) to disgruntled regional politicians and populace 
instead of debating its merits. Vehement and sometimes violent domestic protests led 
to the shelving of the idea of signing a border treaty with Burma.101 By not taking 
various domestic stakeholders into confidence prior to the boundary demarcation, the 
government risked and eventually did face severe domestic pushback. Questions over 
loss of territory became routine both in the parliament and the media, and the central 
government’s lack of consultation with stakeholders from Northeast before signing the 
agreement, though constitutionally correct, created more problems on the ground than 
expected. For a state that sought to deepen and legitimize its presence in the Northeast, 
the boundary agreement had the exact opposite effect. The Indian state became, for 
many, an unwelcome entity that was erecting false barriers between communities by 
accepting colonial territorial constructs for its own purposes. 
 
Conclusion  
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Today, India and Myanmar have instituted a Free Movement Regime (FMR) 
that allows citizens of both sides to travel across the border without a visa for 16-km.102 
In practice, there is no checking mechanism even if citizens from either side cross the 
16-km mark and enter deeper into the other country’s territory – rendering the border 
pillars largely meaningless. 103  The tri-junction with China in the Walong sector 
continues to remain disputed and militarized. Unlike the Doklam crisis where 
Bhutanese support was critical for Indian planners, the situation is likely to be different 
if similar hostilities break-out at the Myanmar tri-junction. This is simply because 
Myanmar extricated itself from the border dispute – making it strictly bilateral 
between China and India – in 1961. Had India secured an understanding on the 
boundary issue with Burma before the 1961 Sino-Burmese agreement, it is possible 
that the situation around this tri-junction would be similar (not the same) to the one 
at the Bhutan tri-junction. In this context, this article raised the question: why did 
India seek formalization of its boundary with Burma in 1967? Based on analysis of 
hitherto unexplored archival material, it argues, first, that domestic politics and 
security trumped external factors in this case. Given the potency of the Sino-Indian 
rivalry, this is a counter-intuitive finding. It shows that intentionality can be incorrectly 
assumed when offering retrospective explanations of foreign policy decision-making. 
Geopolitical trends that seem obvious, then, may receive excessive analytical weight at 
the cost of understanding the actual policymaking process.  
Rivalry with China and Pakistan, or India’s territorial prickliness, does not 
adequately explain how India’s Burma policy evolved in the mid-1960s. Pressures on 
the ground with the outbreak of the Mizo insurgency in 1966 (and ongoing Naga 
separatism), combined with pressures in the parliament, imparted sufficiency and 
urgency to the boundary issue. It was becoming apparent to India that the state needs 
to be an attractive entity in the Northeast to counter separatist discourses. And for the 
state to develop as a service provider in the region, it needed well-defined 
administrative boundaries with Burma (and ideally with China). For this purpose, 
India was willing to make reasonable territorial concessions to Burma that did not 
require huge loss of cultivated and inhabited land. Being a smaller power that was not 
contesting the core principle of independent India’s inherited territorial constructs, 
Burma was not viewed as a threat in New Delhi. Conceding territory to such a 
neighbour was a low cost to pay for what India was to receive in return. That 
formalization of this boundary would also undermine Chinese propaganda of India 
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being incapable of resolving border disputes peacefully was an added advantage, not 
the core purpose of the agreement. Formalizing the boundary with Burma, from an 
Indian perspective, was not just a foreign policy decision (even if it was treated as one), 
but equally a domestic decision wherein the state intended to extend its administration 
to previously ungoverned spaces. Disaggregated in its presence and distribution 
potential, boundary delineation was necessary for India to ensure provision of goods 
and services to its citizens on the periphery. This case of foreign policymaking by a 
postcolonial state struggling to assert its authority on an unaccepting populace in its 
periphery and desiring to formalize its sovereign limits in a region marred by 
international (and domestic) territorial disputes, is critical in making sense of Indian 
decision-making.   
Lastly, such a historically grounded study of a postcolonial states’ behavior in 
international relations also complicates assumptions about territoriality. Despite 
public rhetoric, India did not view the boundary issue in a zero-sum light. If anything, 
all three parties to the conflict were (and to continue to remain) largely comfortable 
with certain degree of ambiguity in their territorial disputes. This is because a definite 
resolution of boundary disputes is likely to result in both territorial gains and losses 
for all parties. While showcasing gains is easy, justifying loses to domestic audiences is 
difficult. Such territorial compromises, though sensible from a systemic perspective 
(i.e. India as a weaker power accepting the reality of the threat from a stronger China), 
come with a heavy domestic political cost. It is for this reason that both the India-China 
and India-Myanmar boundaries continue to remain ambiguous. Simply put, the 
domestic political cost of resolving these disputes (in the light of these countries’ 
colonial past and current sensitivities) is higher than the accruing rewards. For 
instance, the fallout of Indira Gandhi’s (miscalculated) determination to demarcate the 
boundary despite local and national protests is still visible. Northeast India continues 
to remain a hotbed of insurgencies and organized crime, and the salience of the 
boundary issue is yet to subside. The Indian state came to be viewed as one that was 
willing to compromise Manipuri, Naga, or Mizo interests to secure its own. Ironically, 
for a postcolonial state wanting to offer itself as a viable alternative to the people of the 
region, such lack of consultation and respect of their interests on this boundary issue 
ended up increasing suspicion about its intent and resistance against it purpose. 
 
 
 
 
